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THE LEGALIZATION OF SPORTS BETTING:
A FEDERALISM FRAMEWORK
AND THE HORSE RACING MODEL

Douglas L. McSwain*
INTRODUCTION

What happens in Vegas is not staying in Vegas anymoreat least not when it comes to sports betting. Many states are poised
to legalize sports wagering after the United States Supreme Court
striking the
rendered its decision in Murphy v. NCAA,l
Professional and Amateur Sports Protections Act of 1992 (PASPA).
Sports betting may be coming soon to a location near you!
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court in Murphy struck
down PASPA on the grounds that it unconstitutionally
"commandeered" state legislatures by forbidding them from
2
legalizing sports betting in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
Murphy confirmed that Congress can regulate sports wagering,
and even ban it altogether pursuant to its power to regulate
interstate commerce in Article I, Section Eight of the
Constitution.3 Congress can only do so, however, in a law that
operates directly on bettors or betting entities acting in, or
4
affecting, interstate commerce. Congress cannot merely prohibit
5
states from enacting laws that legalize sports wagering.
PASPA did just that by effectively requiring states to
continue with their historical state-law prohibitions on sports

* Douglas L. McSwain, Partner, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP; B.A., cum laude,
1979, Vanderbilt University; J.D. with distinction, 1983, University of Kentucky College of
Law.

v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
at 1479.
3 Id. at 1476.
4 Id. at 1476-77.
5 Id.

I Murphy
2 Id.
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wagering.6 Prior to enacting PASPA in 1992, virtually every state
prohibited sports wagering with notable exceptions such as
Nevada-where wide open sports betting was long permitted-and
a few other states such as Delaware, Montana, and Oregon, where
some forms of such wagering existed pre-PASPA and were
grandfathered in when PASPA was passed.7 Because PASPA
prohibited states from legalizing or expanding sports betting, the
Court in Murphy announced its means of regulating sports
wagering unconstitutional in violation of states' reserved powers
in the Tenth Amendment.8
With PASPA falling, numerous states are considering
legalizing sports betting, and some have already done so or
expanded it as of the writing of this Article.9 State officials are
salivating over potential new revenue from the taxation of sports
wagering and the prospect of additional proceeds unrelated to
income, property, user fees, or other taxes. These potential
revenues are fueling an impetus among state officials to consider
legalizing or expanding sports betting. 10
Sports leagues and players' associations are also eyeing the
potential for enhanced revenues from sports wagering. Most
leagues and players have reversed their long-standing opposition

6 See 28 U.S.C. § 3702, invalidatedby Murphy
v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n.,
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) ("It shall be unlawful for - (1) a governmental entity to sponsor,

operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or (2)
a person to spon-

sor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity,
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or
indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more compet-

itive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games.").
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a).
8 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
9 See Ryan Rodenberg, State-by-State Sports Betting Bill Tracker, ESPN (Mar.
12,
2019), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_lid/19740480/gamblng-sports-betting-billtracker-all-50-states [http://perma.cclP2L7-PY4X].
10 The prospect of a great deal of additional revenue from sports wagering for
states may not actually be realistic. See, e.g., COMM'N ON THE REV. OF TifE NAT'L
POL'Y To-

WARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN AMERICA 178 (Nina Graybill et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter
GAMBLING],
https://ia802205.us.archive.org/4/items/gamblinginameric00unit/gamblnginameric00unit.pdf [http://perma.cc/6VRC-9JEHI ("The potential for raising revenue is
much lower in single-event sports betting than in other types of wagering, due to the
low
takeout. Any attempt by a State to raise the takeout rate above that used by illegal
bookmakers would drastically reduce the ability of the legal game to compete with
its illegal

counterpart.").
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to sports betting post-Murphy." Many take a more recent posture
in favor of legalization based on the opportunities for revenueenhancement from the licensing of sports data or player
statistics, 12 or the imposition of "integrity" fees that are meant to
13
cover the costs of identifying, Monitoring, and punishing athletes
or referees who demonstrate a lack of sports integrity by cheating
or committing fraud. Some leagues are also calling for "royalties"
14
to be paid to the leagues, teams, or players. What these revenueenhancing positions reflect is a proprietary sense of "ownership"
that leagues and athletes share when confronted with the prospect
of others generating revenue from betting on their athletic
activities.
The federal government is weighing re-entry into the
prohibition or regulation of sports betting, evidenced by House
Judiciary Committee hearings on September 27, 2018 regarding
sports wagering, as well as Senate Minority Leader Charles E.
Schumer (D) and Sen. Orin G. Hatch (R) calling for renewed
federal legislation dealing with sports betting. 15 In December 2018,
Sen. Hatch introduced the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act

"t See,

e.g., Emily James, NCAA Supports FederalSports Wagering Regulation,

AM),
10:00
2018,
17,
(May
ASS'N
ATHLETIC
COLLEGIATE
NAT'L
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-supports-federal-sports-wa-

gering-regulation [http://perma.cc/7DLY-KAZA]

("While we recognize the critical role of

state governments, strong federal standards are necessary to safeguard the integrity of col-

lege sports and the athletes who play these games at all levels.").
12 See, e.g., David Purdum & Darren Rovell, Winners, Losers ofSports Betting
23
Legalization, ESPN (May 15, 2018), http://www.espn.comlchalk/story//idl/ 510946/big(discussing
[http://perma.cc/JH67-GX7N]
gest-winners-losers-sports-betting-legalization
the future of sports data and its growing value as sports betting is legalized).
13 Brendan F. Conley, How the Rise ofthe DailyFantasySports Industry can Catalyze the Liberalization ofSports Betting Policiesin the UnitedStates, 66 BUFFALO L. REV.
715, 773-74 (May 2018) ("Moreover, the NBA and MLB, seemingly in preparation for a
gambling-friendly verdict in Murphy, are actively lobbying at the state level for one-percent
of state-sponsored sports betting revenue to go to the leagues, in the form of an 'integrity fee."'); see also, Dustin Gouker, Why NBA, MLB Apparently Think They're Going to
Lose the New Jersey Sports Betting Case, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 12, 2018, 11:29 AM),
77
51/nba-mlb-lose-christie-vs-ncaal
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/1
to ESPN, the NBA and Major League Baseball
("According
[http://perma.cclWG9K-PP9E]
are behind the effort in Indiana-if sport wagering is legalized in the state-to give one
percent of handle to leagues as an integrity fee.").
14 Richard N. Velotta, Leagues Seeking Royalties from Sports Wagering May be
Let Down, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (May 19, 2018, 2:38 PM), https://www.reviewjour-

nal.comlbusiness/business-columns/inside -gaming/leagues-seeking-royalties-from-sportswagering-may-be-let-down/ [https://perma.cc/2Q5G-UXYE].
15 S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018).
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of 2018 to regulate sports betting. 16 This bill would allow states to
establish online sports wagering, prohibit wagers on most amateur
sporting events, restrict bets when needed to "protect contest
integrity," and prohibit this type of wagering by individuals under

twenty-one. 7 It would also require operators to use only data
provided or licensed by teams or leagues, would facilitate
coordination between states on the issue of sports betting, and
would designate a non-profit to evaluate suspicious transactions.1 8
As state and federal legislators begin debating legislation
to legalize sports wagering, a number of considerations should be
kept in mind. First, an understanding of federal gambling statutes
other than PASPA will provide a foundational backdrop for how
sports betting legalization must be fashioned. Next, an
understanding of the traditional "federalism" approach to
gambling in the United States as modeled within federal statutes
pertaining to interstate off-track wagering on horse racing will be
instructive. Interstate horseracing laws function without federal
oversight and leave states with complete control over what forms
of gambling to permit within their borders, yet require them to
cooperate and not interfere with each other's gambling policies.
Finally, I will assess the national "federalism" framework under
federal horseracing statutes and compare those statutes to other
sports and sports betting in general to yield valuable insight for
those considering legislation of sports betting at the federal and
state levels.
Since wagering on sports appears poised to grow rapidly in
the United States,1 9 a rational framework needs to be conceived to
protect not only the integrity of all sports, but to ensure sports
betting is conducted in a functional, consistent, and easily
navigable regulatory framework. Some states may never legalize
sports wagering, but many already have or will. 2 0 Regardless of
what any one state does, the proliferation of legalized sports
betting is inevitable, and will impact sporting events and
competitions everywhere, even in those states that choose never to

"1Id.; see also Adam Candee, Hatch, Schumer Preparingto Drop FederalSports
Betting Bill in Senate, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 19, 2018, 7:58 PM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/26901/federal-sports-betting-bill-drop/ [https://perma.cclL4RR-U7SF].
17 Candee, supra note 16; see also Conley, supra
note 13, at 774.

18 Candee, supra note 16.
i9

Rodenberg, supra note 9.

20

Id.
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legalize it. Legislators should not rush into legalizing sports
betting without considering the current legal playing field and
lessons from the nation's prior experience in regulating gambling
on sports. If history's lessons are ignored, prior errors and
omissions are bound to recur. 2 1
I. FEDERAL LAWS APPIUCABLE TO SPORTS WAGERING
AND THEIR CONTINUING IMPACT ON LEGALIZATION EFFORTS
Any new state or federal law intended to legalize sports
wagering must operate alongside current federal statutes
governing sports betting other than PASPA, which is no longer
enforceable after Murphy.2 2 A wide array of federal laws still apply
to sports gambling, but the most salient are discussed in this
Article. Generally, federal statutes build an underlying federal
support system for state laws prohibiting some or all forms of
gambling.
One of the most significant federal statutes governing
sports wagering is the Interstate Wire Act, which is often referred
to as the Federal Wire Act (or simply the Wire Act), as amended,
and found at 18 U.S.C. § 1084.23 The Wire Act prohibits persons in
the business of wagering or betting from transferring or
transmitting sports wagering information across state lines or over
wire facilities, including the internet, unless wagering on the
sporting events or competitions is legal in both the state where the
betting information originates and the state where the information
is sent and received. 24
In September 2011, the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a surprisingly narrow interpretation

21 'Those Who Fail to Learn From History Are Doomed to Repeat It, NATURE'S
http://www.nffonline.com/industry2014),
28,
(August
LTD.
FOODS,
FINEST
news/2014/08/28/those-who-fail-learn-history-are-doomed-repeat-it
to
[https://perma.cc/9UE5-5KRHI ("'Those who cannot remember the past are condemned
repeat it.' (George Santayana-1905). In a 1948 speech to the House of Commons, Winston
Churchill changed the quote slightly when he said (paraphrased), Those who fail to learn
from history are condemned to repeat it."').
22 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
23 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
24 Id. at (a).
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of the Wire Act, 2 5 construing it to apply only to wagering on
sporting events. In late 2018, the OLC reversed its 2011 opinion
and construed the Wire Act to apply more broadly, including sports
betting among a number of other covered wagering activities, 26
while also reversing its earlier interpretation of a related federal
anti-gambling law pertaining to the use of the internet for
gambling transactions, 27 discussed further below. Regardless of
whether the OLC's 2011 opinion or its 2018 reversal is correct, 28
the key takeaway with respect to the Wire Act is that it prohibits
sports gambling businesses from taking or receiving betting
information across state lines in states where sports wagering is
illegal. Regardless of which OLC opinion controls for federal law
enforcement purposes, the Wire Act prohibits the transmission of
sports betting information across state lines unless exclusively
between states where such betting is legal. 2 9
Another important federal statute pertaining to sports
wagering, entitled the Bribery in Sporting Contests Act, 30 makes
it a federal criminal offense to influence by bribery any sporting
contest if the scheme involves the use of interstate commerce in
any way. 3 1 This statute is not limited in effectiveness to only states

2 Memorandum for Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, from Virginia A. Seitz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel
(Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter OLC Memo] ("Crim. Mem.") https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/09/31/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8EJW7WMPI (on file with the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 35).
2 Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 42 Op.
O.L.C.
1
(Nov.
2,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1 121531/download
[https://perma.cc/6MPC-SUP8].
27 See id. at 17-18; see also Unlawful Internet Gambling and Enforcement
Act of
2006, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5366.
8 The 2011 OLC opinion is consistent with an Eastern District of Louisiana decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. OLC Memo, supra note 25; see In re
Mastercard, 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001), alfd, 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1084 at (a). Until courts decide the precise
scope of the Wire Act,
legal uncertainty exists with respect to online and mobile device betting because betting
instructions inevitably cross state lines when wire facilities that operate in interstate commerce are used. As a result, even if a bettor enters betting instructions-i.e., places her
bet-and her betting instructions are received and acted upon by the betting operator-i.e.,
her bet is accepted-within two states where it is legal to wager on sports, one or more
states in which the wire facilities are located and through which her betting instructions
may cross, may treat sports betting as illegal, and implicate federal law. While arguably the
mere location of wire facilities should not create a Wire Act concern, other federal antigambling laws prohibiting financial institutions from handling internet wagering transactions are likewise implicated by the uncertainty of the scope of the Wire Act.
:10 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2012).

"I Id. at (a).
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where the proscribed conduct is already unlawful under state or
33
local law, 32 nor does it pre-empt state or local law. Likewise, it
does not abrogate or interfere with collegiate or professional
own rules
sporting associations' private enforcement of their
34 This statute
prohibiting sports bribery or corruptive influences.
broadly criminalizes a range of corrupt practices that could
contaminate a sporting event and applies not just to athletic
participants but also to referees or "any individual," who3 5 might
attempt to influence or corrupt a sporting event's outcome.
Other federal laws affecting sports wagering include the
36
the Interstate
Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA),
(ITWPA),37 the
Act
Paraphernalia
Transportation of Wagering
Interstate and Foreign Travel and Transportation Act in Aid of
Racketeering Act ("The Travel Act"),38 the Racketeer Influenced
9
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),3 and the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA).40 Much like the Wire Act, all of these
federal laws reinforce and support states' anti-gambling laws, each
41
Specifically, the IGRA prescribes how
with its own specific focus.

Native American tribes may permit gambling on tribal lands
within state law and compacts that tribes must negotiate with
states. 42 The ITWPA, in turn, criminalizes the interstate transport
of betting tickets and related writings to wagering pools for
sporting events. 43 The IGBA prohibits five or more persons from
conducting a gambling business for thirty days or more, and
handling $2,000 or more per day in gross revenue, if the business's
operations violate state or local law." The Travel Act criminalizes
the use of interstate facilities in a broad array of unlawful

32

Id. at (b).

33 Id.

34 Id. at (c)(2).
35 Id. at (c)(3).
36 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2012).

§ 1953.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
39 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1990.
40 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
18 U.S.C.
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b);
§1962(a); 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).
§ 1962(a);
42 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5); 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (b); 18 U.S.C.
1955(b)(1)(i).
§
U.S.C.
18
see
§
2701(5);
25 U.S.C.
43 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a).
44 18 U.S.C. § 1955(c).
37 18 U.S.C.
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activities, including for illegal gambling businesses.45 Finally,
RICO acts as the enforcer by imposing criminal and civil penalties
for violation of the aforementioned federal statutes if "enterprises"
operate in violation of numerous state or federal laws, including
anti-gambling laws. 6 In summary, if states treat sports betting as
illegal, federal law treats it likewise within the realm of interstate
commerce, but if states legalize sports betting, then federal law
generally permits it within and between states that have legalized it.
Another federal law affecting sports wagering is the
Unlawful Internet Gambling and Enforcement Act (UIGEA).47
UIGEA focuses on prohibiting funding transactions for gambling
that occurs over the internet.4 8 UIGEA restricts financial
payments between businesses for internet betting or wagering. 49
UIGEA requires regulation at the federal level to monitor financial
"participants"-typically banks-involved in payment
systems
that fund internet wagering; the regulations require these
participants to implement policies and procedures to block the
processing of internet wagering transactions with the notable
exception of fantasy sports and horse race wagering. 0
Also affecting sports wagering is the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act, better known as the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA), which is an anti-money-laundering law (AML) that requires
"money services" businesses including casinos and
card clubs to
report large monetary transactions ($10,000 or more) through
confidential suspicious activity reports (SARs), with enforcement
through the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).51
The BSA, together with other federal AMLs, effectively prohibits
bettors from structuring their monetary transactions for betting so
as to evade the law's reporting obligations. Depending on how

18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1)-(3).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c).
7 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367.
18 See 31 U.S.C. § 5363.
45

49

d.

5o 31 U.S.C. § 5364(a)(1)-(2).
51 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314 (2001)
(establishing one location of the Bank
Secrecy Act); see also 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2010) (codification of the ability and enforcement
powers of the Federal Crimes Enforcement Network); see generally FinCEN'
Mandate
From Congress, FEDERAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes [https://perma.ccl868E-EUS9] (explaining the interplay between the Bank
Secrecy Act and the Enforcement powers of FinCEN as it relates to SARs).
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sports wagering is legalized and regulated within states, operators
might have to comply with the BSA and its regulations.
The foregoing does not exhaustively cover the federal laws
that might apply to or affect sports betting, but they do reveal a
robust federal legal playing field that continues to regulate sports
gambling activities apart from PASPA. This federal playing field,
unless amended, fixes the boundaries within which legalization of
sports betting must occur; it affects not only the manner in which
any state legalization effort must be carried out, but requires
Congress, if it chooses to legislate again on sports betting postMurphy, to consider amendments to currently applicable federal
statutes.
Before leaving this discussion of the post-Murphy federal
legal playing, one other important federal sports wagering law
(alluded to in the UIGEA discussion above and discussed in detail
below) is the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 (IHA).52 The IHA
embodies a federalism-style approach that models how Congress
and state governments could operate together to regulate sports
betting, keeping maximum control within states to prohibit or
regulate any form of gambling, while avoiding federal oversight
through agencies and maintaining federal legal support of states'
gambling laws and policies.

53

II. THE INTERSTATE HORSERACING ACT:
APPROACH TO TIE REGULATION
"FEDERALISM"
A
OF HORSE RACE WAGERING ACROSS STATE LINES
A. Backgroundof the Enactment of the InterstateHorseracingAct
In 1972, Congress began considering legislation to regulate
interstate off-track wagering on horse racing after New York City
Off-Track Betting Corporation (NYC OTB) accepted off-track bets
on the Kentucky Derby without the agreement or consent of
54
Churchill Downs Incorporated, the sponsor of the Derby. For
months prior to the 1972 Derby, NYC OTB unsuccessfully tried to

15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-07 (2000).
3 See id. at § 3001.
54 Interstate HorseracingAct:Hearing. on S. 1185 Before the S Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 95th Cong. 19 (1977) (statements of Thruston B. Morton, Former
U.S. Senator and President of American Horse Council).
5
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negotiate a remunerative arrangement with Churchill Downs in
exchange for a contract permitting it to accept off-track wagers on
the Derby.55 Failing in that effort, NYC OTB went ahead and
accepted bets on the Derby anyway, defending its action on the
grounds that the nature and popularity of the Derby obviated any
necessity for a contract with Churchill Downs to take bets on the
race."6 Additionally, NYC OTB claimed that the Derby was, in any
event, in the public domain.5 7 Under New York law and New York
regulators' authorization, NYC OTB argued it could legally accept
wagers on the Derby regardless of Churchill Downs's contractual
consent.5 8 As a result of this incident, Churchill Downs, other
racetracks, and horsemen's associations around the country
decried NYC OTB's action as "pirating [their] valuable property
rights," and began lobbying Congress to prohibit any form of offtrack betting on horse racing across state lines.5 9
Several congressional bills were introduced in the mid1970s to prohibit "interstate off-track wagering."6 0 However,
racing and off-track betting interests began to merge after years of
Congressional
consideration of prohibitive legislation,
as
legislators recognized the need to negotiate a resolution between
federal interdiction and permissible state regulation. Federal
legislators were generally uninterested in any federal agency
regulating horse racing or off-track betting, preferring instead a
"federalism" approach that left complete control over racing and
off-track wagering to the states.6 1

s5 See GAMBLING, supranote 10, at 137.
56 See id.

57 InterstateHorseracingAct: Hearing. on S. 1185 Before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 95th Cong. 127 (1977) (statements of Paul R. Screvane, President of
NYC OTB Corp.).
58 See id. at 128.

5 Id. at 71.
m See, e.g., S. 2834, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 14071, 94th Cong. (1976); H.R. 13875,
94th Cong. (1976); H.R. 11993, 94th Cong. (1976); H.R. 11610, 94th Cong. (1976).
61 See S. Rep. No. 95-1117, at 3 ("While this bill provides for
the regulation by the
federal government of interstate wagering on horseracing, there will be no Government enforcement of the law."); 124 CONG. REC. H34899-900 (Oct. 10, 1978)(statement of Rep. Fred
Rooney: "This bill does not require any Federal money. There is not an additional agency.";
statement of Rep. Joe Skubitz: "I am also satisfied that this bill will increase cooperation
between the various interests involved in off-track wagering but will not, and this is critical,
involve the creation of a new bureaucracy to regulate interstate wagering on horse-racing.

There is no provision for Federal Government enforcement of this law.").
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B. FinancingofHorseracingthroughPari-MutuelWagering
Virtually every state that allowed horse race wagering at
the time of the IHA's enactment used a racing commission to
oversee and regulate the sport and wagering on it, uniformly
62
allowing a form of betting known as "pari-mutuel wagering."
Unlike other sports in the United States, horseracing is financed
almost entirely through amounts withheld from pari-mutuel bets
on races. Bettors do not wager against a sports book, betting
operator, or the house (i.e., the racetrack that sponsors the race) in
63
the pari-mutuel form of wagering. Instead, they wager against
each other and the sponsoring racetrack withholds from their bets
64
a commission-known as a "takeout." Out of this takeout, the
racetrack pays state wagering taxes and funds a portion of its
operational expenses. 6 5 The track then pays back to winning
6 6 In
bettors that portion of each bet not "taken out" as winnings.
the United States, the takeout rate is set by law or racing
regulators, averaging about twenty cents from each dollar6 7bet,
with the remaining eighty cents returned to winning bettors.
The sponsoring racetrack not only pays taxes and operating
expenses from takeout but also funds the purse account and other

15 U.S.C. § 3002(13) (2000); see also Handicapping101, N.Y. RACING ASS'N
(2019), https://www.nyra.comlbelmont/racing/nyra-wagering-info [https://perma.cc[R6PPYSXU] (Pierre Oller introduced "parier mutual" in his native France in 1865 meaning "mutual stake" or "betting among ourselves." As this form of wagering was adopted in England
62

it became known as "Paris mutuals," and soon thereafter "parimutuels." Pari-mutuel odds

reflect how much is wagered on each horse or combination relative to the size of the mutuel
pool).
63 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ky. Jockey Club, 38 S.W.2d 987 (Ky. 1931).
6 15 U.S.C. § 3002(20).
65 Id.

66 Id.; see also Lakhani v. Comm'r, 142 T.C. 151, 165 (2014) ("iHe must have
known that takeout represents the track's share of the betting pool and that the expenditures therefrom satisfy obligations of the track, not the betters.").

67 See generally, CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD, REGULAR MEETING 2-2 (June
2 00

2008), http://www.chrb.ca.gov/Board/board-packages/Jun-

8.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6LX-

2Z7X]; PA. DEP'T OF AGRIC., DOwNS AT MOHEGAN SUN POCONO, 2018 WAGERING FORMAT

https://www.agriculture.pa.gov/Animals/RacingCommission/Docu(2018),
ments/2018%2OHorse%20and%2OHarness%2OTake-out%20rates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8VD-V89X]; Jennie Rees, Kentucky Downs Reduces Pick 4 Takeout To
14 Percent, PAULICK REPORT (Aug. 21, 2018 2:50 PM), https://www.paulickreport.com/horseplayers-category/kentucky-downs-reduces-pick-4-takeout-to- 14-percent/ [https://perma.cc/2NFX-3P3X1; Molly Jo Rosen, HorseSense: UnderstandingTakeout,
BET AM. EXTRA (Feb. 26, 2014), https://extra.betamerica.com/horse-sense-understandingtakeout/ [https://perma.ccl2ZCK-L3NZI.
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benefits for the horsemen and horsewomen racing their horses at
the track.6 8 The track's purse account is the lifeblood of horseracing
because owners and trainers race their horses for purse awards,
and make their livings through them. 69 From their purse winnings,
jockeys, 70 or drivers,7 1 stable employees, grooms, exercise riders,
veterinarians, and farriers are compensated, and boarding and
other stall expenses are paid. In short, the financial viability of
horseracing as a sport depends entirely on takeout.
C.
The IZ4 "Compromise" that Enshrines Racing Interests'
ProprietaryClaim andEstablishesStates as 'Primary"Regulators
of Off-Track Wagering
In 1978, when several interstate horse racing bills were
again introduced in Congress, 72 racing interests (made up of "host
racing associations" and racehorse owners, trainers, and breeders'
associations)73 negotiated with off-track betting interests to permit
interstate off-track wagering only if racing's survival could be
ensured in spite of the sport's financial dependency on wagering.
Host racetracks analogized themselves to "theaters" 74 and the

s See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19605.7 (2016); FLA. STAT. §§ 550.625(a)(b),
550.6505 (2000); N.Y. Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 527(d)(iii)
(McKinney 2016) (Horsemen and horsewomen racing at the track typically bargain collectively with the track to fund the purse account in contracted-for amounts from the takeout,
and they also bargain for other benefits that are funded from takeout; however, in some
states, state law may require the track to fund the purse account and other benefits
for
employees and horsemen from the takeout.).
6 See generally id.
70 A jockey is a "person who rides or drives a horse
especially as a professional in
a race." See, e.g., Jockey, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2019), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/jockey [https://perma.cclRZS8-9NW2].
71 See, e.g., Harness Racing History, SCARBOROUGH
DOWNs (2014),
http://www.scarboroughdowns.comlHarnessRacingHistory.php
[https://perma.ccIN35RPL3Z] ("Harness racing is a worldwide sport where a special breed of horses, called Standardbreds, race around a track while pulling a driver in a two-wheeled cart, called a
sulky.").
72 Compare S. 1185, 95th Cong. (1977),
with H.R. 14089, 95th Cong. (1978) (containing identical language in both the Senate bill and House bill).
73 15 U.S.C. § 3002(9) (2018).
74 InterstateHorseracingAct:HearingonS 1185Before the
Comm. on Commerce,
Sci., & Transp., 95th Cong. 21 (1977), https://www.congress.gov/bill95th-congress/senatebill/118 [https://perma.cclTFG2-V5FP].
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76
horsemen5 to actors "putting on the show." As such, host tracks
and horsemen considered themselves generators of all wagering
dollars bet on racing. Accordingly, racing interests refused to agree
to off-track betting interests gaining any legal right to accept
wagers on horse races in other states--such as the legal right NYC
OTB thought it had to accept off-track bets on the 1972 Derby77
without the racing interests' express consent.
Similar to the claims of sports leagues and players'
associations today, racing interests in 1978 claimed "proprietary
78
rights" in their sport and argued that the "product" of their sports

15 U.S.C. § 3002(12) (using "horsemen" is standard in the industry used in a
gender neutral sense and is inclusive of both horsemen and horsewomen, and no slight

75

and
whatsoever is intended to the critically important women-owners and women-trainers

other women who work and function within the sport of horseracing by this article's use of
this standard industry term "horsemen"); Interstate HorseracingAct: Hearing on H.R.
14089 Before the H. Subcomm. on Transp. & Commerce of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 18 (1978) ("This bill is intended predominantly as a preventive
measure and to establish the-proprietorship of the people who are putting on the show.").
76 See InterstateHorseracingAct: Hearingon H.R. 14089 Before the Subcomm.
on Transp. & Commerce of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 18
(1978) (testimony of Arnold H. Kirkpatrick, Exec. Sec'y of the Advisory Comm. on Racing in
the American Horse Council: "This bill is intended predominantly as a preventive measure
and to establish the proprietorship of the people who are putting on the show.").
77 See generallyBennett Liebman, The Wire Act and The InterstateHorse Racing
Act: How Did We Get Here., Address at Albany Law School Government Law Center (May
3,

2007),

in

ALBANY

LAW

SCHOOL

GOVERNMENT

LAW

CENTER

https://www.al-

.

-

banylaw.edulmedialuser/glc/wireactandtheinterstatehorseracingact.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GKR2-9G3A].
78 See InterstateHorseracingAct: Hearing on S 1185 Before Subcomm. on Com
& Transp., 95th Cong. 71 (referring to racetracks' and horsemen's "valuable
Sci.,
merce,
property rights" being "pirated" by out-of-state off-track betting operators); see also Interstate HorseracingAct: Hearingon HR. 14089 Before the H. Subcomm. on Transp. & Commerce of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 15 ("This bill will present (sic) [i.e., prevent] an off-track betting system in one State from using a race in another
State without the permission of the parties that have a propietaryinterestin that race."
(emphasis added)). This same "proprietary" sentiment was mirrored in the comments of the
floor sponsors of S. 1185 on the Senate floor when the bill was debated. See 95 CONG. REC.
31,553 (1978) (statement of Sen. Magnuson) ("The most important feature of this legislation
is that it establishes the proprietary relationship of the horseracing industry: that is, the
horsemen and the racetracks over its own races."); Id. at 31,554 (1978) (statement of Sen.
Huddleston) ("[TIhis legislation represents an effort to protect only the proprietary rights of
those engaged in racing. . .

76

KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 11 No. 1

'

competitions were the pari-mutuel bets generated on races. 7 9
Racing interests believed their proprietary rights would be
infringed unless federal legislation granted them effective control
over off-track wagering to protect their property from potential
over-proliferation of off-track betting to the detriment of liveracing tracks, including "minor league" tracks," and prevent the
diminution of the entire sport.8
Off-track betting interests sought only to assure that under
federal law they could continue to accept legal off-track wagers on
races occurring in other states. They were especially interested in
ensuring they could accept bets on nationally recognized races
such as the Kentucky Derby and other similarly renowned "special
event" races. 82
These competing interests negotiated a "compromise" that
Congress adopted when it passed the IHA." Two years before the

-

7 See InterstateHorseracingAct: Hearingon S. 1185
Before Subcomm. on Com
merce, Sci., & Transp., 95th Cong. 15 (1977) ("It's ... not without precedent in other fields
of protecting the product of one operator undue exploitation that can be damaging to it by
another. . . . There are precedents for this kind of protection. It just happens to be in the
gambling field."). The arguments of racing interests back in the 1970s is similar to that of
sports leagues and players' associations today, but not identical in the sense that horseracing, as a sport, depends largely on wagering take-out for the sport's financial viability. See
James, supra note 11. Professional and amateur collegiate sports exist today wholly separate and apart from financial dependency on sports wagering. That stated, the similarity in
arguments put forth by sports leagues and players claiming to "own"-in a proprietary
sense-the underlying sports contests and statistics and data generated from and around
those contests are clearly analogous.
0

InterstateHorseracingAct:Hearingon S. 1185Before Subcomm. on Commerce,

Sci., & Transp., 95th Cong. 113 (1977) (explaining the necessity of minor tracks for breeding

and training purposes).

8' 95th CONG. REC. 31,555 (1978) (statement of Sen. Mathias) ("I understand
the
horsemen's concern that interstate off-track betting, if allowed to spread in an uncontrolled
manner, will result in the closing of a large number of the country's racetracks and the
diminution of the sport.").
82 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3002(17), 3004(b)(2) (2018).
8 See, e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 31,553 (statement of Sen. Magnuson) ("I think this
compromise version [of the IHA bill] represents a reasonable compromise between these
opposing viewpoints [referring to the opposing views of racing and off-track betting interests]."); id. at 31,552 (statement of Sen. Huddleston) ("It has already been detailed how the
evolution of this [IHA] bill transpired, and I can say that it is the result of long and arduous
hours of discussion and compromise among the horse industry, the off-track betting industry, and the Statels] (sic) through the National Association of State Racing Commissioners."); id. at 31,558 (statement of Sen. Williams) ("[Tihe various parties involved in this
industry-the racetracks, the horsemen, the off-track betting interests, and the States
themselves-have developed the 'Mathias amendment,' which is the bill in its present form.
I believe that whenever all parties involved in a controversy . . . agree on a position which
is reasonable, lawful, and desirable, it must have great merit to it.").
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IHA was enacted, the Commission on the Review of the National
Policy Toward Gambling issued a final report that heralded the
tradition in this country of states functioning as the primary
regulators of gambling within their borders, with the federal
government providing only a supporting role to states' gambling
laws and policies. 84 This national policy toward gambling embodies
a "federalism" approach to the regulation of gambling and the
compromise embodied in the IHA incorporates a "federalism"
structure.
i. The 1976 reportof the commission on the nationalpolicy
toward gambling

-

The Commission started its review of the national policy
toward gambling around 1972 after Congress created it in the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.85 The Commission's report
represents the only comprehensive federal review to date of the
national impact of gambling in the United States and includes the
results of several surveys, as well as assessments of state and
federal laws and policies in regulating or prohibiting any and all
forms of gambling.86 While bills have been drafted and introduced
in Congress since the Commission's 1976 report that would
87
establish another similar study-and-review Commission
especially in light of the tremendous expansion of gambling since
1976-Congress has not yet authorized or commissioned an update
of the original national gambling policy report issued by this
1970s-era Commission.
Notwithstanding the more than forty-year age of the
Commission's final report, many of its findings are as relevant
today, post-Murphy, as they were in 1978 when Congress relied on
the report to enact the IHA. In particular, the report's first
national policy announced:

84

GAMBLING, supra note 10, at 2.

85 See Organized Crime Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
86 See GAMBLING, supra note 10.

87 See, e.g., NationalPolicies Toward GamblingReview Act of 1995 Hearingon
HR. 462 Before Comm. on the Judiciary& Comm. on Res. & Comm. on Ways & Means,
104th Cong. (1995).
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The Commission believes that the States should
have the primary responsibility for determining
what forms of gambling may legally take place
within their borders. The Federal Government
should prevent interference by one State with the
gambling policies of another, and should act to
protect
identifiable
national
interests.
The
Commission recommends that Congress consider
enacting a statute to insure States' continued power
to regulate gambling.8 8
This national policy is reflected in the first congressional
finding of the IHA itself.8 9 The Commission's report recommended
that the 94th Congress not adopt then-pending legislation (H.R.
14071) that would have prohibited all interstate off-track betting
"to protect and further the horseracing industry" only.90 Instead,
the Commission urged Congress: "That unless there is evidence of
a national interest or of interference by one State with the
gambling policies of another, each State should have the primary
responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally
take place within its borders." 91 Congress adopted this very
rationale, reciting it in the IHA's third finding, 92 and proclaiming
its overall policy to be "to further [both] the horseracing and legal
off-track betting industries in the United States." 9 3
ii. The IHA'sprohibitionand consent structure embodies a
private interest "compromise" and grants states the
'prim ary"regulatoryrole over interstateoff-track wagering
The beauty of the IHA is that it does not create a federal
regulatory body or assign any federal agency to oversee interstate

8

See GAMBLING, supra note 10, at 5.

- 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(1) & (2) ('(a) The Congress finds that- (1) the States should
have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally take
place within their borders; (2) the Federal Government should prevent interference by one
State with the gambling policies of another, and should act to protect identifiable national
interests .

. .").

90 See GAMBLING,

supra note 10, at 140.

m Id.

* 15 U.S.C.
9m Id. at (b).

§

3001(a)(3).
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off-track betting; rather, it endows states-via their state racing
commissions--to act as the sole regulators of whether and how
much interstate off-track wagering to permit on horseracing
within their states, preserving states' "primary responsibility" over
gambling regulation. 94 But the IHA also ensures states cooperate,
95
and cannot interfere with each other in carrying out their roles.
It ensures this cooperation through a unique prohibition and
6
consent structure.9
First, the IHA prohibits all interstate off-track wagering
with a simple ban: "No person may accept an interstate off-track
9 7 Following this
wager except as provided in this chapter."
sentence, the IHA spells out several prerequisite consents that, if
98
fully satisfied, lift the prohibition. The first prerequisite consent
99
is that of the host racing association -i.e., the host racetrack
sponsoring the race. As a "condition precedent" to the host track's
consent,10 0 however, another prerequisite consent-that of the
10 1 The horsemen's
"horsemen's group"-must also be obtained.
group consent requires a written agreement between the host
track and the horsemen's group that spells out "terms and
103 Following
conditions"10 2 for the host track to give its consent.
these private racing-interest consents, the IRA confers consents
onto the state racing commissions of both the host state and the
off-track betting state. 104 Courts have interpreted the satisfaction

Id. at (a)(3).
9 Id. at (a)(2).
- 15 U.S.C. § 3004.
97 15 U.S.C. § 3003.
- 15 U.S.C. § 3004(a)(1)-(3).
9

-

100

Id. at (a)(1).

Id. at (a)(1)(A).

101 Id. The "horsemen's group" is defined as "the group which represents the

majority of owners and trainers racing [at the host racing association], for the races subject
to the interstate off-track wager on any racing day." 15 U.S.C. § 3002(12).
102 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 3002(22), with 15 U.S.C. § 3004(a)(1)(A).
03 This "condition precedent" creates the horsemen's group's consent right to the
interstate off-track wagering. See Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n-Ohio Div. v.
DeWine, 666 F.3d 997, 1000 (6th Cir. 2012) ("In practice,. . . the Act does require the consent
of the horsemen's group."). This horsemen's group's "consent" is often referred to as the
horsemen's "veto." Ky. Div., Horsemen's Benev. & Prot. Ass'n v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n,
20 F.3d 1406, 1415 (6th Cir. 1994). I represented the horsemen's associations in both of
these cases.
10 15 U.S.C.

§ 3004(a)(2)-(3).
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of all of these prerequisite consents as mandatory before any

interstate off-track wager may be legally accepted.1 05
The IRA, with this prohibition and consent structure,
adopts
the "federalism"
approach
recommended by the
Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward
Gambling. The approach also ensures that states do not interfere
with each other's policies prohibiting, or regulating, horseracing or
wagering.1 0 6 Consequently, no state can legally authorize a local
off-track betting operator to take bets on races occurring in another
state, unless the other state's racing commission has consented.1 0 7
This prohibition and consent structure paved the way for
horseracing and off-track betting interests to reach the
aforementioned "compromise,"108 thus opening the door for
Congress to enact the IHA with full industry support. 109
The IHA's prohibition and consent structure, unlike the
PASPA statute stricken in Murphy, has weathered constitutional
challenges pursuant to the Commerce Clause (i.e., unlawful
delegation of congressional power to regulate commerce),110 the
Tenth Amendment
(i.e., anti-commandeering),In
and the
Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., vagueness and irrationality in
violation of "substantive due process").112 The IRA has survived

1o See, e.g., De Wine, 666 F.3d at 999-1001 (stating
that consent of the host racing
association's horsemen's group is required); Turfway Park RacingAss'n, 20 F.3d at 141215 (upholding the IHA's constitutionality despite occasional vague language and discussing
the required nature of the consents in § 3002(a)(1) and referring to the racetrack owner's

and the horsemen's group's consents as "veto" rights).
10 See GAMBLING, supra note 10, at 8.

Compare 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(2) & (3), with § 3004(a)(2) & (3).
95 CONG. REC., supra note 78, at 31,552-53 (statement of Sen. Magnuson).
10 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. H34,897-99 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of
Rep. Carter) ("The [horse racing] industry has gotten together with the off-track betting
people and they have reached a compromise which is supported by all segments of the racing
industry"); see also 124 CONG. REC. H34,897-900 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Skubitz) ("I am satisfied that this [IHA House] bill is an acceptable compromise to meet the
needs of the racing [and] legal off-track betting industries") (Note: the IHA House bill, H.R.
14089 was identical to the Senate bill, S. 1185, which was ultimately enacted as the IHA);
see also 124 CONG. REC. S31,552-53 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978) (statement of Sen. Huddleston) ("It has already been detailed how the evolution of this [IHA Senate] bill transpired,
and I can say that it is the result of long and arduous hours of discussion and compromise
among the horse industry, the off-track betting industry, and the State[s] (sic) through the
National Association of State Racing Commissioners."); see also 95 CONG. REC., supra note
78.
11o See Turfway Park RacingAss'n, 20 F.3d at 1416-17.
11 See id. at 1415-16.
112 See id. at 1413-16.
1
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these legal challenges in large part because of its prohibition and
consent structure.1 13 The United States Supreme Court long ago
approved of this kind of regulatory structure as early as 1917,114
re-affirmed in 1939,115 and it was reapproved by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1994 in upholding the IRA's
constitutionality.1 16 The Sixth Circuit also upheld the
constitutionality of the IHA against a First Amendment attack
based on the argument that the IHA's regulation of telecasting
(i.e., simulcasting) horse races infringed a racetrack's "commercial
speech;" however, the Sixth Circuit recognized the central scope
and purpose of the IHA was to regulate only interstate off-track
wagering-not simulcasting, telecasting, or any other form of
broadcasting of horse racing.117
i. The IEL4s market-areaapprovals intend to protectlive
racingand the sport itself
The IHA further creates market-area approvals in addition
8
to its prerequisite consents discussed above.1" Its market-area
approvals were included to protect live-racing tracks from financial
disruption due to the potential for overgrowth of off-track betting
on interstate simulcasts to off-track betting sites located near liveracing tracks.11 9 The IRA's market-area approvals protect both

See id.
See Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (explaining
that a legal structure that imposes general property restrictions may constitutionally be
removed and lifted by one half of the property owners affected by the restrictions).
115 See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939) (explaining that a legal structure whereby Congress places a restriction upon its own regulation by withholding its operation unless two-thirds of those affected by the restriction vote for it).
116 Turfway ParkRacingAss'n, 20 F.3d at 1416.
IHA is to
i1 See generally id. at 1412 (illustrating that since the object of the
regulate interstate off-track wagering, the trial court's striking the IHA on First Amendment grounds did not withstand appellate scrutiny. The object of the IHA is not to regulate
the telecasts of races, but instead, the wagering accepted on races. The IHA makes interstate wagering on horseracing illegal unless appropriate consents are obtained, and it does
so regardless whether the race on which the wager is placed is telecast-i.e., simulcast or
113
114

broadcast-or not).
1"8 See 15 U.S.C. § 3004(b).
I19 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 3002(14), with
95-1117, at 4145 (1978).

§

3004(b)(1)(A) & (B); see also S. Rep. No.
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"60-mile tracks" 120 and adjoining-state tracks, 121 but are subject to
exceptions for "special event" races in states that allow near yearround pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing.1 22
The courts have interpreted the IHA's market-area
approvals as enforceable only by the host racing association, its
horsemen's group, and the host or off-track state racing
commissions. 123 The market-area approvals are not enforceable by
live-racing tracks,
off-track betting sites, or horsemen's
associations located in the off-track betting state because of the
IHA's narrow civil enforcement scheme. 124 These approvals are
arguably less successful in accomplishing their original intent for
inclusion than the prerequisite consents discussed above. 125 But,
to date, Congress has not amended the IHA to reverse the court
decisions that limit the enforceability of the IHA's market-area
approvals. 12 6
III. Is THE IRA AN APPROPRIATE MODEL
FOR THE LEGALIZATION OF SPORTS BETTING?

Since 1978, the IHA has been amended only once-in
2000-to expand its scope by permitting electronic off-track
wagering.1 27 The lack of any other amendments over its nearly
forty-one-year lifespan suggests it could embody a worthy model

120 Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. P'ship
v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, Inc., 989
F.2d 1266, 1269 (1st Cir. 1993).
121 15 U.S.C. § 3004(b)(1)(B).
122 Id (explaining that consequently the exception
spelled out in the IHA for "special event" races arises only in states with racing days of at least 250 or more per year. This

number of racing days works out to near year-round racing given that racehorses are typi-

cally not raced every day of the year).
123 See SterlingSuffolk Racecourse Ltd. P'ship, 989 F.2d at 1270-73; accord New
Suffolk Downs Corp. v. Rockingham Ventures, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (D. NH. 1987).
124 See generallySterlingSuffolk Racecourse Ltd. P'ship, 989
F.2d at 1273; accord
New Suffolk Downs Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (D. NH. 1987) (note, this does not mean
that the state laws of the off-track betting state may not provide market-area protections
enforceable by private parties in that state).
125 Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 10-13, Sterling
Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. P'ship.
v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, Inc., 989 F.2d 1266 (1993) (No. 92-2260), 1993 WL 13625149.
126 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007.
127 15 U.S.C. § 3002(3); Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 1(a)(2), 14
Stat. 2762, 2762A-108
(2000) (adding "and includes pari-mutuel wagers, where lawful in each State
involved,
placed or transmitted by an individual in one State via telephone or other electronic media
and accepted by an off-track betting system in the same or another State, as well as the
combination of any pari-mutuel wagering pools" to the definition of"interstate off-track wager.").
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for the legalization of sports betting in general. Many admire the
IRA's "federalism" structure that leaves to states primary control
over sports gambling, yet ensures that sports participants are
capable of receiving some form of remuneration from the betting
that occurs on their sport. 128 This section explores whether the IRA
is a good model for sports betting legalization in general.
As a legislative model, the IRA might be called "good" if it
has successfully regulated horseracing and wagering across state
lines-but success is not easily measured, at least objectively. As a
matter of law and policy, the IHA's success has been debated in
29 and industry commentary. 130
various places-in both litigation
From the perspective of revenue for the sport, the IRA has
unquestionably grown total wagering dollars on horseracing. In
1980, total wagering handle was about $6.6 billion, and that grew
to a peak of just over $15.9 billion in 2003; in 2017, total handle
131
dipped to about $11.5 billion. Even so, total handle by 2017 had
grown significantly since 1990, leaving no doubt the IRA has
132
expanded total revenue for the sport.
Notwithstanding that revenue growth, some commentators
see foreboding trends-especially since much of it occurred after
2000 when Congress enacted minor amendments to the IRA that
133 Since 2000, an increasing
had major impacts on the sport.
amount of wagering handle comes from off-track betting, but less
of that growing handle seems to flow back into horsemen's

See, e.g., TurfwayParkRacingAssn, 20 F.3d at 1416-17 (6th Cir. 1994).
See Turfway ParkRacingAss'n, 20 F.3d at 1410-15.
130 See, e.g., Joel Turner, New Racing Economics Show Inadequaciesof 1978 In1s
129

[hereinterstate Horse Racing Act, THOROUGHBRED RACING COMMENTARY (Feb. 16, 2015)

after Turner, RacingEconomicsl,https://www.thoroughbredracing.com/articles/new-racing[https://perma.cc/Q3FSeconomics-show-inadequacies- 1978-interstate-horse -racing-act
InPA3Q]; Joel Turner, Update the 1978 InterstateHorse RacingAct-Survival of the US
dustry Depends on it, THOROUGHBRED RACING COMMENTARY (Feb. 17, 2016) [hereinafter

Turner, SurvivaA, https://www.thoroughbredracing.comlarticles/update- 1978-interstatehorse-racing-act-%E2%80%93-survival-us-industry-depends-upon-it
[https://perma.ccl2SM6-GV9S].
"I1 Pari-MutuelHandle,THE JOCKEY CLUB (2019),_http://www.jockeyclub.com/default.asp?section=FB&area=8 [https://perma.cc/G4J2-QLMT].
132 Id.

'0

(2000).

15 U.S.C.

§

3002(3); Pub. L. No. 106-553,

§

1(a)(2), 14 Stat. 2762, 2762A-108
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purses. 13 4 Even in 2017, when total handle dipped to $11.5 billion,
an increasing share of total wagering revenue came from off-track
handle at just over eighty-five percent. 135 The 2000 amendments
unquestionably initiated tremendous growth in off-track betting
by allowing electronic wagering through what is now called
"account deposit wagering" (ADW wagering) via computers and
mobile devices, which permit wagers to be placed anywhere a
bettor is located so long as it is legal to wager there. 136 However,
ADW wagering raises bettor poaching issues,13 7 as well as fairness
concerns stemming from market integration and consolidation
between certain larger racetracks and ADW companies. Some
argue this distorts the agreement process between host racetracks
and their horsemen and casts a shadow over the future health of
the sport unless legislative changes are made to the IHA. 138
A. ComparisonsBetween Horseracingand Other Sports
Regardless of the concerns regarding the IRA and its
amendments, there is no question that race wagering has grown
beyond the most generous projections of the 1978 Congress that
originally enacted the IHA and those who supported its passage.

1:3
See, e.g., Cummings Associates, Analysis of the Data and Fundamental
Economics Behind Recent Trends in the Thoroughbred Racing Industry, NAVL HORSEMEN'S
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ASS'N (2004), https://nationalhbpa.com/wp-content/uploads/cummingsreport7-17-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM9N-PEPU]; Turner, Survival, supra note 130.
1

Pari-MutuelHandle, supra note 131.

13 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1101 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 4-38-1014-38-501 (West 2017) (stating that some jurisdictions do not allow gambling or wagering in
any capacity. For example, Utah State Law prohibits risking anything of value contingent
upon the outcome of any contest, game, scheme, or gaming device when the outcome is based
on chance. Additionally, horse wagering (licensed or otherwise) is also prohibited); Turner,
RacingEconomics, supra note 130.
37

Bettor "poaching" occurs when bettors who would otherwise go to a local
race-

track and wager on racing are encouraged by the ease of ADW wagering and financial in-

centives offered by ADW companies to forgo making a trip to the track to bet, and instead
to wager via their ADW account, either online or via their mobile device. ADW companies
have traditionally lessened the impact of "poaching" by offering to pay source market fees
to racetracks based on the wagers taken from bettors whose residences are located within a
twenty-five or fifty-mile radius of the track to help ameliorate the loss of bets from bettors
who might otherwise have attended the track to wager. But, even so, ADW betting returns
less economically to the horsemen's purse account than wagers placed on-track, and in the
long run, ADW betting may continue to be perceived by horsemen as not fairly contributing
to the sport of horseracing.
138 Turner, RacingEconomics, supra note 130.
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Given that horseracing depends on wagering for financial viability,
the IHA can only be viewed as a financial success. Still, whether
financial success alone means the IHA is a "good" model for the
legalization of sports betting in general depends, in part, on the
comparison between horseracing and other sports.
Horseracing clearly differs from other sports in multiple
important ways. First, other sports exist financially separate from
betting while horseracing depends on it. Horseracing's dependence
on wagering is a key reason racing interests in 1978 claimed their
proprietary rights were pirated after off-track betting interests
began taking bets on racing without their consent. Additionally,
their property-based claims are what informed the IHA
compromise that ultimately permitted interstate off-track
wagering to be legalized subject to the consents of the host racing
association and its horsemen's group.
At the dawn of sports betting spreading nationwide, sports
leagues, players' associations, and athletes are asserting similar or
equivalent property-based claims. Their clamor for royalties,
integrity fees, exclusive licensing rights of official sports data, and
statistics for use in sports betting are all variations on a theme
arising out of the concept of ownership and property rights on
which they base their claims to remuneration from sports betting
revenue. Their property-based notions, while differing in legal
foundation, are clearly analogous to the proprietary rights claimed
by racing interests back in 1978 at the dawn of the IHA.
That stated, regulation and governance of horseracing
differs significantly from other sports, and likewise the regulation
of wagering on racing differs from the regulation of sports betting.
Because of horseracing's long association with wagering, state
racing commissions (or similar racing regulatory bodies) were
created to protect the public from both improper conduct in and
3 9 For
around the horse races and from improper wagering.
example, state-approved racing stewards are the eyes and ears of
the state's racing regulatory body. In some ways, stewards function
like officials-such as referees or umpires in other sports-rn that
they call fouls committed by racehorse jockeys or drivers during
race competitions. But, in other ways, they are unlike other sports'
officials because they enforce rules that apply outside of race

139

See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 230.215

(LexisNexis 2018).
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competitions, such as rules to ensure no improper race medication
was administered to a racehorse prior to a race,1 40 or rules
permitting stewards to eject undesirable persons from track
grounds, 14 1 to name a few.142
Additionally, state racing regulatory bodies are charged
with overseeing the wagering process, including promulgating
rules that govern wagering and hearing disputes arising out of
wagering. 143 State racing bodies issue permits or licenses to
racetracks and off-track betting sites allowing them to accept
wagers on horse races. They oversee state laws governing if and
how wagering is allowed-e.g., on-track wagering only, or
interstate and intrastate simulcast wagering, as well as ADW
wagering. Finally, they oversee the wagering process itself,
including the licensing and oversight of tote companies that
tabulate on-track and off-track bets, and that calculate the everchanging pari-mutuel odds displayed to bettors. In this respect, the
IRA allows state racing commissions to decide whether to allow
merged wagering pools across state lines; but under the IIIA's
rubric, states must cooperate multi-jurisdictionally in exchanging
wagering information to properly oversee the tote companies and
the multiple betting sites that feed betting information into them,
wherever they may be located.
In other sports, enforcement of competitive rule violations
or event infractions, as well as oversight of officials' calls or unruly
spectators, are not the responsibility of any public state regulatory
body. Integrity concerns in the performance of other sports are
matters typically overseen by a "private integrity oversight
entity"1 4 4 such as a sports league, outside commission, committee,

140 See,

e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.260 (LexisNexis 2018).
141 Id.
142 Stewards' actions are reviewable by the state racing
regulatory body, and stewards cannot take adverse action against a racing licensee or permittee without the state
providing a due process-compliant procedure for review, usually in an administrative hearing process in which the racing regulatory body reviews and decides, in a final decision,
whether to adopt, modify, or reverse the stewards--a racing regulatory body decision that
is further appealable into the state court system. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
14: See generallyKY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.260 (LexisNexis 2018); 3 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9311 (2018).
1 See, e.g., Global Public Square Staff The Real Problem with Sports'Governing
Bodies,
CNN
(June
17,
2014,
12:57
PM),
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/1 7 /the-real-problem-with-sports-governing-bodies/
[https://perma.cc/KX6F-3Y5R] (explaining that most sports governing bodies are private, or
quasi-private, profiting entities).
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association, or other sports governing body connected to the sport.
Officials' calls are typically unreviewable outside the game or
145 Most private
contest, and seldom, if ever, by a public agency.
integrity oversight entities fashion the rules or codes governing the
sport, and provide enforcement and training of the rules to ensure
sports contests or competitions are conducted or performed with
honesty and integrity by the participants and the officials in
charge of them.
States that have legalized sports betting typically do not
require their state gaming agency or other sports betting oversight
body to monitor and ensure sports integrity. Bets are frequently
taken on sporting events or contests irrespective of whether the
contests are occurring within the betting state or between teams
located solely within the betting state. In these states, it is
principally the sports betting operators and their vendors that are
subject to the state's public regulatory body oversight. That
oversight, however, is focused primarily on ensuring integrity-in
the wagering and its process, not the underlying sporting event or
contest. 146
The dual focus of state racing regulators on integrity in
racing and wagering--coupled with the IHA's requirement that

145 See Mark Maske, VFL Will ConsiderMaking PassInterference Calls Reviewable, After Rams-Saints Gaffe, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/01/21/nfl-will-consider-making-pass-interference-calls-reviewa6
2
ble-after-rams-saints-gaffe/?tid=ss mail&utm-term=.8 a8 bl505e9
Challengingthe Actions of
loannidis,
Gregory
generally
[https://perma.cc/4AMD-8774]; see
a Sports GoverningBody, SPORTS L. & PRACTICE BLOG (Apr. 2, 2013), http://lawtop2O.blog[https://perma.cc/7P8Hspot.com/2013/04/challenging-actions-of-sports-governing.html
GT9X].

* See generallyloannidis,supra note 145. To be sure, the regulatory oversight of
wagering integrity in sports betting states will involve the expectation that betting operators need to monitor their bettors' wagering activity and report suspicious betting activity.
As a result, operators routinely watch for in-person suspicious bettor conduct, and irregular
betting patterns that may appear in data analytics of aggregate betting trends or from inperson observations of suspicious bettor behavior. Suspicious or irregular betting activity of
between
any kind can reveal an investigatory need into whether coordination was occurring

bettors and the participants or officials involved in, or anyone connected to, the underlying
in
sports competition or contest. In this sense, the close regulation of betting operators
with law
sports betting states necessitates the exchange of suspicious betting information
enforcement and sometimes with the sports teams or other private integrity oversight entities charged with enforcing integrity within the sport. This information exchange inevitably
occurs across state lines and will usually involve law enforcement at either the state or
federal level, or both. It may also involve the voluntary, but not legally required, involvement of the sports team or other private integrity oversight entities that oversee the integrity of the underlying sport.
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states cooperate with each other in interstate off-track wageringensure that necessary information for regulatory oversight of both
the sport and wagering is openly accessible to and freely exchanged
between each affected state's racing regulatory body. For example,
if an off-track wagering state's regulator picks up on an unusual or
irregular betting situation, the off-track state can easily reach out
to the host state's regulators under the cooperation requirement in
the IHA. Furthermore, because tote companies are regulated by
the cooperating states, the companies can be quickly contacted to
assist in assessing any noted betting irregularities. This
cooperation helps ensure both the integrity of horseracing and of
the wagering itself because each state's racing regulatory body
oversees both. Additionally, regulators of racing states cooperate
and exchange information through an association of racing
commissioners that assist with integrity and oversight of the sport
and the wagering.1 47

One success of the IHA is the cooperation and information
exchange that necessarily occurs under its rubric between state
regulators. This cooperation and oversight takes no cognizance of
state lines and often involves multi-state input, especially with the
national merged wagering pools involved in most interstate
simulcast wagering.1 48 In contrast, sports betting legalization is
occurring or expanding one state at a time. While the
betting is,
for now, restricted to intrastate wagering (in large part due to
federal interstate gambling laws), the sporting events, contests, or
competitions are typically occurring in other states than the
betting state, or involve teams or athletes from different locations
than the betting state. In other words, practically speaking, an
interstate connection exists with all legalized sports
betting,
although nothing compels states' sports betting regulators to
cooperate with other states' regulators, or with private integrity
oversight entities governing the underlying sports.
With respect to its regulatory framework, the IRA appears
to offer a successful federalism model for regulating sports

14
See generally Ass'N OF RACING COMM'R INT'L,
https://arci.com
[https://perma.ccF4ND-9CWW].
148 Three men were accused of rigging wagers that generated $3.2 million in payoffs back in 2002. See Jon Morgan, ScandalShakes Racing to Roots, BALTIMORE SUN
(Nov.
17, 2002), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2002-11-17-0211170060-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LJ5U-VX4N].
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wagering in general. States have remained in complete control
over what gambling occurs within their borders. Yet, at the same
time, they have had to cooperate and exchange critical information
to help maintain integrity in both the underlying sport and
wagering on it. Should Congress, post-PASPA, decide to legislate
regarding sports betting, it may be worthy to recall the
recommendations in the Final Report of the Commission on the
Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling that informed the
14 9
structural framework enacted into the IHA.
B. Litigation under the IHA
Before announcing the IHA to be a good legislative model
for sports betting regulation, another perspective should be
considered that reviews some of the important litigation arising
under it. Most IHA litigation has involved its interface with, or
impact on, other laws, but some litigation has arisen from its
definitions and enforcement provisions. The nature of these
litigated disputes provide insight into how good of a federalism
model the IRA may be for sports betting legalization in general.
i. Interaction between the IHA and antitrustlaw
The IHA was enacted with less-than-clear legislative
15 0
in any way,
history regarding whether it was intended to repeal,
sport of
the
to
Act
Antitrust
Sherman
the
the applicability of
151
been
long
has
Act
The Sherman
horseracing and wagering.
applied to horseracing as a sport because owners and trainers are
not employees of racetracks. Courts have thus treated them as

See GAMBLING, supra note 10.
H.R. REP. No. 95-1733, at 4 (1978); S. REP. No. 95-554 (1977); S. REP. No. 951117 (1978); see generallySaratogaHarness Racing v. Veneglia, No. 94-CV-1400, 1997 WL
135946, at *5 n.6 ("This [IHA] legislation in no way modifies or affects the scope or application of the antitrust laws," but noting "[t]h[is] quoted passage is from H.R. 14089.... [reported at] H.R.Rep. No. 1733, [but].... the bill that eventually became the IHA was S. 1185
[reported at S. Rep. No. 95-1117]. . .. "); Churchill Downs, Inc. v. Thoroughbred Horsemen's
Group, et al., 605 F. Supp. 2d 870, 885 n.22 (W.D. Ky. 2009) ("[TIhe Senate [Report No. 9511171 did not make any mention of antitrust concerns and this Court is not persuaded that
Congress expressed any intent to apply or repeal the antitrust laws through its enactment
of the IHA."). I served as counsel for the Horsemen's Group in the last case mentioned.
15' Veneglia, 1997 WL 135946, at *5.
149

150
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individual businesspersons in horizontal competition with each
other for purposes of antitrust law. 152
The IHA's intersection with antitrust has spawned several
litigated cases. Most litigation stems from the "horsemen's
group"153 withholding racehorse owners' and trainers' consent to
interstate simulcasting and off-track wagering.1 54 For example,
disagreements have arisen between horsemen's groups and out-ofstate betting sites seeking to simulcast and accept off-track
wagers, but to whom the horsemen have refused to give their
consent. 5 5 Poignant disputes have arisen between horsemen's
groups and the host racetrack itself when the horsemen and track
cannot agree on simulcasting terms and conditions, or their
contract negotiations otherwise stall.15 6 In these circumstances,
the ensuing litigation often involves claims that the horsemen's
group refused to consent in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in
restraint of trade. 5 7
The judicial response to such claims has varied. Some have
held that since the IRA authorizes the horsemen to act collectively
through their "horsemen's group," the IRA must impliedly repeal
antitrust law.15 8 Others have held there is no implied repeal, but
there is simply no antitrust violation for horsemen to do what the
IHA expressly authorizes them to do by and through their

152 See, e.g., Yonkers Raceway, Inc. v. Standardbred
Owners Ass'n, 153 F. Supp.
552 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States Trotting Ass'n. v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781
(7th Cir. 1981).
'53 15 U.S.C. § 3002(12) (2019).
54 See Hileah, Inc. v. Fla. Horsemen's Benevolent
& Protective Ass'n, 899 F. Supp.
616 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Alabama Sportservice, Inc. v. Nat'l Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 767 F. Supp. 1573 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Veneglia, 1997 WL 135946, at *5.
"55 Venegha, 1997 WL 135946, at *5; ChurchillDowns, Inc., 605
F. Supp. 2d at
885-86 n.22.
156 See, e.g., Ky. Div., Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective
Ass'n v. Turfway Park
Racing Ass'n, 20 F.3d 1406 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining Turfway Park counterclaimed
against the horsemen's group that its actions in withholding consent violated antitrust law);
see also Hialeah, Inc., 899 F. Supp. at 616. But see ChurchillDowns, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d
at 885-86 n.22 (explaining that the "horsemen's group" as authorized to act in the IHA itself
must be able to cooperate and act together in exercising the horsemen's IHA consent rights).
"57 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019). The theory of such
antitrust claims is that the horsemen's
group is carrying out the collective will of the horizontally competitive owners and trainers,
and their combined actions within and through the "horsemen's group" amounts to a combination or conspiracy between horsemen in violation of the antitrust laws.
158 See Churchil Downs, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 885-86 n.22.
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"horsemen's group."1 59 How far the IIIA may go, in authorizing
conduct that some may believe violates the antitrust laws, remains
for future litigation;16o however, none of these antitrust claims
would have been litigated had Congress been clearer on how it
16 1
intended the IHA to interact with antitrust laws.
ii. The impact of the IHM on contrarystate laws
The impact of the IHA on inconsistent state laws has
likewise been litigated. The constitutionality of state statutes that
purport to revoke the horsemen's consent right and empower a
state racing commission to overrule the horsemen's group's refusal
to consent to off-track wagering have been successfully
challenged. 6 2 While the IHA endows states with the "primary role"
over the regulation of horseracing and off-track betting-and in
that sense, follows a "federalism" model that elevates state racing
commissions' authority-the IHA as a federal law creates
enforceable private-party civil rights that cannot be restricted or
16 3
denied by state officials acting under the color of state law.
Accordingly, state laws contrary to or inconsistent with the IHA's

159 Id.
160 Part of the reason the horsemen get sued for alleged violations of antitrust
from
based on their collective "horsemen's group" actions-authorized in the IRA-stems

the IHA's ambiguous legislative history that appears to envision the host racetrack having
a "direct" role in negotiating interstate off-track wagering contracts with third parties, and
the horsemen only an "indirect" role. See S. Rep. No. 95-1117, at 7-8 (1978). This "direct"
and "indirect" distinction is dubious at best, and in any event, anachronistic in today's internet-connected world. Moreover, it is contrary to the horsemen's groups' ability to "veto"
simulcast wagering at any out-of-state off-track betting site if such betting at that site
might, in the horsemen's view, be harmful to the sport or otherwise to horsemen's interests.
See TurfwayParkRacingAssn, 20 F.3d at 1415 (horsemen are looking out for the sport of
horseracing). Horsemen's groups wanting to exercise informed consent to interstate, offtrack wagering cannot remain ignorant of the impact that such wagering may have at outof-state locations. To become so informed, the horsemen's group may have to take an active,
more direct role in negotiating terms and conditions of off-track wagering contracts with
prospective out-of-state simulcasting sites.
61 Antitrust law disputes also come up at the intersection of the IRA in other
factual contexts regarding simulcasting and off-track betting. See, e.g., Gulfstream Park
Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1306 (discussing the
application of antitrust laws to simulcasting markets in the context of a dispute between
off-track betting networks of different racetracks in Florida). Again, clarity in how Congress
intended the IHA to interact with antitrust law and policy would have been much more
desirable from the date the IHA was enacted.
162 See Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n-Ohio Div. v. DeWine, 666 F.3d
997, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 2012).
163 See id.
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federally created consent rights may be stricken after litigation
challenging their constitutionality under the Supremacy Clause, 16 4
with the potential for fee-shifting against the state and in favor of
the prevailing litigant.16'
Any potential sports wagering legislation at the federal
level that confers upon leagues, teams, players, or athletes a
federally created right to control whether sports betting occurs at
all or the exclusive right to license the use of only official sports
data or statistics-regardless whether such legislation adopts a
"federalism" framework like the IHA-is subject to the preemptive
effect of the Supremacy Clause.1 66 As a result, Congress should
consider whether and how it intends any federal sports betting
regime to impact or preempt state law.
iii. The need for clarity andpracticalityin key definitions
Litigation has also arisen regarding whether a horsemen's
group "represents the majority of owners and trainers racing" at
the host racetrack "on any racing day."16 7 The IHA's definition of
"horsemen's group" is not as clear in practice as it may appear in
words.168 Disputes between a host racetrack and its horsemen, as
well as between horsemen's groups, can arise as to whether and
which group represents the majority of owners and trainers for
purposes of the host track and the horsemen's group reaching an
agreement to consent to off-track wagering. 169

164 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; See generallyDeWine, 666 F.3d at 1000-01 (declaring
Ohio's statutory scheme to be preempted by the IHA).
165 In De Wine, the Ohio State Racing Commission was ordered to pay the attorneys' fees of the Plaintiff-horsemen's group. Dewine, 666 F.3d at 1000-01. (Please note, I
&

know this because I served as counsel in the case for the Ohio Horsemen's Benevolent

Protective Ass'n). Both attorneys' fees and costs are awardable to prevailing plaintiffs in
civil rights litigation brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2019).
The potential for fee-shifting presents a potent litigation tool against state regulators who
attempt to enforce state laws contrary to the full exercise of the civil rights created within
a federal statute such as the IHA.
l" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
167 15 U.S.C. § 3002(12); Turfway ParkRacingAss'n, 20
F.3d 1406, 1410 (6th Cir.
1994).
'i8See TurfwayParkRacingAssn, 20 F.3d at 1410.
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 3004(a)(1)(A) & (B) (2019); 15 U.S.C. § 3002(12) (2019); see also,
New England Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Mass. Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 270, 275-76 (D. Mass. 2016).
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Unlike union and management election disputes overseen
17 0
by the National Labor Relations Board, the I1HA lacks specificity
as to how a horsemen's group is selected or determined to
represent the majority of owners and trainers. In the absence of
state statutes or regulations that recognize a specific horsemen's
association as the majority group, many state racing commissions
refuse to exercise their regulatory authority over racing to decide
what group represents the majority. Further, from a practical
standpoint, host tracks negotiate their interstate simulcast
wagering contracts with out-of-state betting sites far in advance of
their race meet and not simply on a day-by-"any racing day"
basis.171 And so, the horsemen who enter horses into races at the
host track typically do so long after the track has already
negotiated such contracts. As a result, a key IHA definition-the
"horsemen's group"-lacks a certain amount of clarity and
practicality that leads to litigation.172
iv. The IHA's civil enforcement and market-area appraval
provisions
The 1976 Final Report of the Commission on the Review of
the National Policy Toward Gambling recommends that civil relief
statutes be a means for private parties to assist in enforcing
gambling laws-of course not to the exclusion of federal criminal
173 Based in
enforcement against interstate gambling businesses.
part on this recommendation, the IHA exclusively employs a civil
enforcement regime. 174 Violations of the IHA may be enjoined and
damages may be awarded in civil actions brought by the host
racetrack, the host racetrack's horsemen's group, or the host racing
state.17 5 The regime also provides for nationwide service of process,
venue in the host or off-track state, statutory intervention rights,
and a statutory damages formula that imposes a severe civil

170 See, e.g., Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 787-88 (1996); NLRB v.
Fin. Inst. Emps., Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 198 (1986).
171 See 15 U.S.C. § 3002(12) (2019).
172 See Mass. ThoroughbredHorsemen's Ass'n, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 275-76; Turf
way ParkRacingAss'n, 20 F.3d at 1410.
173 See GAMBLING, supra note 10, at 21.
'7 See Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3006 (2019).
175 Id. at § 3005.
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penalty on IHA violators.17 6 Statutory damages in these actions are
calculated using a formula that multiplies the dollar amount of
illegal wagers by the host racetrack's takeout rate for wagers of the
same type, or the takeout rate at the off-track betting site if the
wager is not of the same type.17 7 This statutory formula typically
results in an amount greater than treble damages under prevailing
pari-mutuel takeout rates for horseracing and damages can,
therefore, be staggering if all eligible parties sue the violator. 178
This stiff civil enforcement remedy comports with the IHA's
original intent-that no federal agency should be saddled with
monitoring the law's compliance.17 9
Interestingly, however, the IHA includes market-area
approval provisions, the violation of which are not civilly
enforceable by the very entities those provisions would seem to
protect. This apparent lack of enforceable protections has resulted
in litigation. 18 0 Consistent with the general rule for federal
legislation, courts have ruled consistently that unless the IRA
expressly confers a private right of action on the specific person or
entity, even if the entity is one of a class the statute is designed to
protect, a remedy is unlikely to be implied.181 Accordingly,
racetracks that are arguably protected by the IHA's market-area

Id. at §§ 3005, 3006(b), & 3007(b).
"7 Id. at § 3005(1). In nationally merged wagering pools, the same takeout rate is
used for all wagering sites betting into the pool wherever the site may be located. Therefore,
the host racetrack's takeout rate would be the same for all off-track betting sites submitting
wagers into its merged wagering pool.
178 For example, if wagers were accepted in violation of the IHA
at an interstate
off-track betting site, the multiplier effect of this formula could be anywhere between eight
to ten times the amount of the illegal wagers if the host racetrack or horsemen's group were
to sue. This is because most host racetracks generally follow a takeout rate of twenty percent
of the amount wagered. This figure represents a blended average rate of both straight and
exotic wagering takeout, so racetracks receive in distribution roughly half of that takeout
in compensation. If the horsemen's group and the host racetrack and the host state were to
jointly sue the violator, the damage formula would be approximately twenty times or more
than the amount of illegally accepted wagers because the horsemen's group and the state
would each be entitled to their respective shares of the takeout in addition to the host racetrack. This example assumes that the illegally accepted wagers are of the same type accepted by the host racetrack. See Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3006(b)
(2019).
179 See supra, note 61.
18 Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. P'ship v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, Inc., 989
F.2d 1266, 1268--69, 1271 (1st Cir. 1993).
1' Id. at 1268-69; see also Mass. Thoroughbred Horsemen's
Ass'n, Inc., 210 F.
Supp. 3d 270, 277 (D. Mass. 2016); New Suffolk Downs Corp. v. Rockingham Ventures, Inc.,
656 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (D. NH. 1987).
176
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approval provisions have been denied judicial relief in suits
challenging off-track betting sites' acceptance of simulcasts and
interstate off-track wagers without the tracks' approval because
the IHA does not expressly empower such tracks to sue; only the
host racetrack, its horsemen's group, and the race's host state are
expressly granted the right to civilly enforce the IHA's
provisions.182
Any potential sports betting legislation at the federal or
state level should envision how compliance monitoring will occur
with or without governmental oversight or agency enforcement. As
the Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward
Gambling recommends, a civil enforcement scheme, as used in the
IHA, should be included; indeed, it is the sole enforcement tool
within the IHA.1 83 Any private entity intended to benefit from
sports betting legislation should explicitly state its civil remedies
because most courts will not imply an enforcement remedy.
C The IHA Permits States to Compete with Each Other, but
Sometimes Results in a "Raceto the Bottom"
As recommended by the Commission on the Review of the
National Policy Towards Gambling in 1976, Congress has
employed a federalism rubric through the IHA that allows states
autonomy to formulate their individual gambling policies- even
84
though such policies are subject to federal pre-emption.1 The
IHA's federalism framework has furthered each state's gambling
policy within its own borders, prevented states from interfering
with one another's policy, and forced states to cooperate if they
85
want to permit interstate off-track wagering.1 The IHA stands as
a federalism precedent that has had the effect of elevating state
law that typically governs intrastate racing and wagering activity
to the successful governance of interstate wagering transactions,
while permitting horseracing to thrive. Since 2000, however, one
drawback has surfaced in how the IHA has functioned: competition
that has developed between states vying to attract ADW operators
to locate and license within their states.

182

15 U.S.C. § 3006(a).

183I

See GAMBLING, supra note 10, at 7-8.
185 See 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(2)-(3).
18
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The

IA's 2000 amendments permit electronic off-track

wagering and this form of wagering permits account deposit
wagering (ADW).186 In ADW wagering, the bettor pre-funds her
betting account held by the ADW operator, then enters her
electronic betting instructions to the operator-typically over a
computer or mobile device-to place a bet from funds held in her
account by the operator. Each ADW operator must be licensed and
holds bettors' account funds per the requirements of its state of
licensure. 187 After a bettor's account is established and funded, the
bettor places her betting instructions from wherever she is located,
which is often not in the same state where the ADW operator is
licensed.
The IHA is silent as to the situs of an electronically placed
bet, but a fiction has arisen that treats the state in which the ADW
operator is licensed and in which the bettor's account funds are
transferred to purchase the betting ticket as the situs of the bet. 188
This fiction, of course, ignores the interests and gambling policies
of the state in which the bettor may in fact be located and where
she enters her electronic wagering instructions to the ADW
operator to place her bet. After the IHA's 2000 amendments and
the rise of this electronic-bet-situs fiction, only one state ends up
having the ability to impose a wagering tax on the ADW wagerthe state where the ADW operator is licensed.
Because only one state gets the privilege of taxing an ADW
bet, states compete against each other to offer the most attractive
ADW tax rate and regulatory environment to entice ADW
operators to locate and license as multi-jurisdictional hubs within
their state. Oregon and North Dakota appear to have won this
state competition,18 9 offering some of the most attractive tax rates
and regulatory oversight for ADW operators and enticing the vast

M8 15 U.S.C. §3002(3).
87

1

See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 230.210

(West 2019); 810 Ky. Admin. Reg. 1:145

(Mar. 2019).

88 Id.
89 Oregon wins this competition hands down. See Nancy
Smith, Florida Race
Tracks are Ripping Off the State for Untold Millions in Tax Revenue, SUNSHINE STATE
NEWS (Feb. 22, 2016, 7:30 AM), http://sunshinestatenews.com/story/florida-race-tracks-ripping-state-untold-millions-lost-tax-revenue [https://perma.cc/757P-FN271. North Dakota to
a lesser extent has benefited. See Mike Nowatzki, Other States Fuel Rise of Onhne Horse
Race Bettingin North Dakota, THE BISMARK TRIBUNE (Mar. 22, 2016) https:/fbismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regionallother-states-fuel-rise-of-onine-horse-race-betting-in/article_9le516cO-1171-503d-acl6-dffbc1c3b990.html fhttps://perma.cc/7LSW-46U4].
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1
majority of operators to their states. 90 That any state can "win" in
a competition with other states may, on the one hand, seem
perfectly fair as any competition has winners and losers, but on the
other hand, the fact that states are competing at all is
counterproductive to the IHA's policy and intent that states should
not interfere with each other's gambling policies (including their
19 1
A
tax or regulatory policies), but rather should cooperate.
competition that pits state against state runs counter to these IHA

goals.
That states compete to attract the largest or the most ADW
operators is predictable behavior. In many "federalism" programs,
federal law elevates state law and policy to "primacy" and states
use their primary regulatory authority to experiment and
innovate-in a microcosm within their borders-until they
discover the best methods to accomplish federal policy goals or
other shared common values. Unfortunately, if federal law leaves
a regulatory vacuum in some significant fashion or fails to
establish minimum regulatory standards, states can find
themselves in a "race to the bottom," competing with other states
in undesirable ways in pursuit of policies counter to federal policy
or common values. Competition between states in some policy
areas may be and often is good, but competition that causes states
to fight over which offers the loosest regulation, the least level of
sports betting oversight, or which is willing to forgo any effort to
ensure sports integrity are not what a "federalism" model should
encourage or permit.

California has its own unique ADW licensure rules that cause many multijurisdictional hub ADWs to also license within California, but California has a large enough
population that access to its market of bettors does not stymie too many ADW operators
from having to be licensed there in addition to being licensed in either Oregon or North
Dakota. See generally Frank Angst, ChangingBusiness Model impacts CaliforniaRacing,
BLOODHORSE (Mar. 2, 2017, 5:06 PM), http://cs.bloodhorse.comfblogs/keeping-pace/archive/2017/02/27/changing-business-model-impacts-cabfornia-racing.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JY74-WMMY]; Ray Paulick, Advance Deposit Wagering Growingin California, BLOODHORSE (July 26, 2002), https://www.bloodhorse.comlhorse-racing/arti[https://perma.cc/F9JAcles/186970/advance-deposit-wagering-growing-in-california
ENRG]. Other states have multi-jurisdictional licensing regimes, but to date, few have
landed licensing ADW operators in such a way as to impose wagering taxes on the bets they
accept from ADW account holders.
91 Turner, Surviva4 supranote 130.
19o
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CONCLUSION

The Commission on the Review of the National Policy
Toward Gambling recommends a "federalism" framework as the
proper way for Congress and the states to regulate sports betting
consistent with both the tradition and history of overseeing
gambling activity within the United States. Like them or not, and
despite their age, the Commission's "federalism" recommendations
should not be ignored as legislative efforts mount before Congress
and in the states regarding sports betting. Key portions of the
Commission's Final Report are worth repeating:
*

"Gambling has customarily been controlled by State
agencies, which can be flexible and responsive to local
demands; the Commission finds no public interest in
preempting this authority by the imposition of binding
national standards. . . [Wjhere gambling is concerned there
should be a considered reluctance on the part of the Federal
Government to interfere with State policies. . . States
should be left the determination of what forms of gambling,
if any, are to be permitted . . ."192

*

"There are, however, instances where positive action by the
Federal Government may be necessary to the protection of
identifiable national interests. . ."19 3

*

"The Commission thus believes that Congress should
consider taking action to protect the States' continued
authority to determine their own gambling policies. It was
by similar means that Congress protected State regulation
and taxation of insurance in 1945,194 after the Supreme
Court had held insurance to be an activity of interstate
commerce.1 9 5 Congress responded to the Court's ruling by
passing a statute consenting to the regulation of the
insurance business by the States . . . . Congress thus

192 See GAMBLING, supra note 10, at 5-6.
93 Id. at 6.

2019)).

21)Id. at 7 (citing McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
"

§§

, Ad. at 7 (citing United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322

1011-1015 (West

U.S.

533 (1944)).
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established the validity of State insurance regulations,
which otherwise might have been challenged as
96
unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce."'
*

"An appropriate method of achieving this objective would
be the enactment of a Federal statute specifically
empowering the States to regulate gambling within their
borders."1 9 7

*

"The Commission emphasizes that such a statute would not
foreclose the authority of Congress to legislate with respect
to gambling where a federal presence became necessary.
Congress could selectively enact statutes concerning those
areas which it deemed to involve the national interest, and
could act to prevent the channels of interstate commerce
from being used by some States to interfere with the
gambling policies of other States. We submit that such a
protection of State and national interests would conform
with the sound principles of federalism upon which this
98
country was established."

The fundamental point of these recommendations is that
"federalism" should be preserved in any federal attempt to regulate
99
gambling or legalized sports betting.1
In 1978, Congress identified national interests with respect
to interstate off-track wagering on horseracing. After Murphy,
Congress may again identify national interests in the legalization
of sports betting. There are certainly multi-state facets to-and
interstate effects from-sports betting; so the potential for one
state's gambling policy to interfere with another's can easily give
rise to a national interest for Congress to act by requiring states
with legal sports betting to cooperate and work together not only
with other states, but with private sports integrity oversight
entities to ensure the maintenance of sports integrity at all times.
The Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 (IHA) provides a
legal precedent indicative of how Congress and the states have

Id. at 7.
Id.
198 Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
199 See id. at 173-78.

196
197
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followed a "federalism" framework to accomplish recognized
national interests, while promoting primacy in state regulatory
control over horserace wagering. The IHA does not supply every
answer as to how best to structure a "federalism" framework, and
many of its shortfalls are pointed out in this Article. Imperfect as
it is, the IRA provides a model that, with some alteration, can point
the way forward post-Murphy.
The IHA preserves states' roles as the primary regulators
of gambling within their own borders, while also balancing
competing private interests much like those currently represented
by sports participants, athletes, leagues, and those of sports
betting operators. The IHA regulates a unique sport that has
important differences from other sports. Those differences aside,
the IHA commendably permits the market to drive the pricing of
interstate off-track wagering rights and states have plenty of room
to vary their taxing policies and rates on horserace wagering
within the prevailing takeout rates in that market. 20 0 A similar
market-driven model for sports betting may not have much room
for states to vary their tax rates because margins for sports betting
operators are much narrower than in horseracing. 201 Despite these
difference between prevailing takeout rates in horserace wagering
and the margins in sports betting, states that want to legalize
sports betting can-in a properly constructed "federalism"
framework-set their tax rates according to what the sports
betting market will bear and adjust their revenue expectations
accordingly. States can be expected to do this sort of adjustment to
avoid the loss of betting dollars to the illegal sports betting market.
Additionally, within a "federalism" framework, Congress
can set regulatory parameters permitting states not only to adjust

200 The one exception that constrains states regarding their
tax policies on
horserace wagering stems from the fiction that has arisen regarding the situs of electronically placed bets-a problem, that should be avoided in any sports betting legislation to
avoid states competing with each other in undesirable ways in a "race to the bottom." See
supra text accompanying note 189. This problem also forewarns that states may sometimes
behave in ways that are counterproductive to national policy goals by competing with each
other for being the first or earliest adopters of expanded sports betting, but in doing so, they
can fail to adequately consider national interests or shared common values "in a race to the
bottom."
201 See Jeremy Balan, Symposium: Sports Betting
Not 'Golden Goose'for Racing,
BLOODHORSE
(December
5,
2018),
https://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/23 10 2 6 /symposium-sports-betting-not-golden-goose -for-racing
[https://perma.ccl4MyYR-LKGR
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to the sports betting market, but preventing them from interfering
with each other's gambling policies. It would additionally
encourage states to regulate legalized sports betting in ways that
promote interstate cooperation and information exchange between
sports betting regulators, operators, and private sports integrity
oversight entities. In the long run, such cooperation is imperative
to ensure that sports integrity is maintained along with sports
betting oversight.

